

Approved For Release 10/10/2010 : CIA-RDP29T00975A007300030001-7  
**TOP SECRET**

25X1

2 October 1963

Copy No.

25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Department review completed

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Approved For Release 10/10/2010 : CIA-RDP29T00975A007300030001-7  
**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

2 October 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

2. Philippines-Malaysia: President Macapagal believes tensions over Malaysia will abate.  
(Page 2)

25X1

6. USSR - Communist China: Soviet leaders may organize a new international Communist meeting to isolate Peiping further. (Page 6)

7. Venezuela: A sharp crackdown on the left authorized. (Page 7)

25X1

11. Notes: [redacted] Israel - Arab States;  
25X1 Nigeria; Cambodia; [redacted]

25X1

**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

Philippines-Malaysia: ( Philippine President Macapagal remains optimistic that tensions in the area over Malaysia will abate.)

Macapagal told Ambassador Stevenson on 30 September that his government definitely intends to recognize Malaysia in the near future, and has no intention of following Indonesia's lead of economic confrontation. He is hopeful that another summit meeting of the three Maphilindo countries can be held sometime in November.

Macapagal said he felt that Indonesia's hostility would lessen, and he interpreted Sukarno's recent actions as largely dictated by domestic political pressures. The Philippine President expressed confidence that Indonesia would end up by recognizing Malaysia and that economic and trade relations would be resumed in due course.

Macapagal consistently has explained his policy toward Malaysia as being based on the two principal objectives of restraining the Indonesians while influencing them toward the free world and of protecting the Philippines' claim to part of Sabah (North Borneo).

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

**Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

25X1

USSR - Communist China: The Soviet leaders may be organizing a new international Communist meeting.

25X1

They appear to believe that Peiping's rejection of the nuclear test-ban treaty has created a favorable opportunity for exploiting this forum to discredit and isolate the Chinese. Pravda's publication during the past week of appeals by three small Western Communist parties for such a meeting suggests that Moscow will attempt to rally a great majority of foreign parties in condemning Chinese dogmatism, "splitting activities," and attacks on the Soviet leadership.

Hints that Moscow now favors a new conference may be designed to pre-empt a Chinese initiative to convene a meeting in Peiping.

25X1

25X1

A Soviet decision to proceed with the meeting would constitute further evidence that Moscow is deliberately seeking to provoke the Chinese into some action which the USSR could represent as Peiping's formal separation from the Communist movement. The Chinese would certainly challenge the legitimacy of such a Soviet-sponsored conference and might convene a rival meeting of their followers in Peiping.

25X1

Venezuela: (President Betancourt has authorized a sharp crackdown on the left.)

(A general roundup of extreme leftist leaders, including members of congress, began on 30 September. Among those taken into custody are the Communist Party's secretary general and two members of its politbureau.)

25X1

([redacted] the Communist Party and the pro-Castro Movement of the Revolutionary Left will soon be declared illegal by the Supreme Court.)

25X1

(These developments represent a radical step for Betancourt, who heretofore has shied away from the use of repressive measures of questionable legality. His change of heart at this time probably reflects a belief that nothing less would forestall some form of military intervention.)

(The military has, for many months, unsuccessfully urged the government to take stronger steps in dealing with Communist-inspired terrorism. Their sense of frustration may have come close to the breaking point when terrorists carried out a particularly brutal attack on an excursion train last week end.)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

**Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

25X1

25X1



Israel - Arab States: (The Israeli project for diverting water from the Jordan River basin may be finished in December and actual withdrawals from Lake Tiberias on a continuing basis should begin about mid-1964, according to the latest timetable. Arab hostility toward the scheme remains strong, especially in Syria, but efforts to develop a coordinated plan of opposition in the Arab League have again been deferred. Syrian harassing raids against the project may nevertheless occur.)

25X1



25X1

Nigeria: (The success of a three-day general strike which ended on 30 September is likely to strengthen the position of WFTU-supported leftist union leaders, who were the driving force behind the strike. The leftists have been trying to forge the badly disunited Nigerian labor movement into a unified organization which would have potentially great political as well as economic power. Most unions supported this strike, which ended after the government apparently agreed to establish a "high-powered" wage revision commission.)

25X1



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk, apparently convinced that the Communist threat to South Vietnam and, therefore, to Cambodia is increasing, is tailoring his public position accordingly. His recent statements have become more servile to Peiping, and last week he exchanged friendly personal messages with the head of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front--the Viet Cong's political arm. At the same time, Sihanouk has told diplomatic representatives that he believes a change in government in Saigon might still prevent a Communist take-over there, and assured them that Cambodia's policy of neutrality and nonalignment will be maintained.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

## THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7  
**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300030001-7  
**TOP SECRET**